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ABSTRACT 
In human society, the majority of individuals try to achieve objectives that are individual to them, carrying this out, in the 
majority of cases, in an independent m anner. It has in fact been  repeat edly verif ied that s ome individuals  are ab le to 
function as catalysts, introducing ideas an d technology that go ag ainst the ideological currents that govern their social 
relationships. A variety  of factors can be indicated as being partly  responsible for this capacity  for innovation and social 
adaptation, one of them being the perpetuation of collective memory by means of written texts, the press, and by all the 
different new types of media th at we have today at our disposal, and which are used by certain individuals in determined 
contexts to obtain some ty pe of  advantage. What effect, however, would pre judice have when a pplied to s trategies of 
interaction in  a  social network ? Prejudi ce is so mething th at is genera lly consid ered to be pejorative. Tak ing the free 
circulation of information amongst individuals within a social network as a basic premise, would it be possible to  affirm 
that we would always achieve improved perfor mance of so ciety as a whole when th e collective memory is loaded with 
prejudice? This work attempts to provide an answer to that question, analysing the relationship between the efficiency of 
a social networ k and the memories of the individuals who make it up , when the network itself is not immune from 
information that is (potentially) incorrect. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
History is full of the names of people who made a difference. Inventors such as the Wright brothers, Einstein, 
and many others, who acted as catalysts of change by presenting technologies that disrupted the ideological 
currents that governed their social relationships. According to Adam Smith, cooperation between individuals 
takes place e ven whe n the  indi viduals are  trying t o ach ieve objectives that are s pecific to them , it being 
sufficient th at the resu lts of this co operation maximizes p rofit. In  other words, if th ere is an adv antage to 
cooperating, individuals tend naturally to do it (Dug atkin, 2000). The perpetuation of collective memory by 
written tex ts, the press an d all th e d ifferent types o f new media that are av ailable to  us to day permits the 
sharing of i nformation, w hich ser ves t o "inform" or red uce uncertainties with in determin ed contex ts 
(Hackbarth, and  19 99). In  a d eeper loo k at  so cial n etworks nowad ays, and at th e ind ividual’s ab ilities to  
make decisions using collective memory, we arrive at the definition of collective intelligence raised by Pierre 
Lévi (Lév y, 19 98), "An  in telligence d istributed ev erywhere: th at is o ur in itial ax iom. No body k nows 
everything, everybody knows som ething, all th ere is to  k now is foun d with in hu manity." Bu t when  th e 
individual capacity to validate facts that they think they know is limited, so that part of the information that is 
circulating on the so cial n etwork is biased or ev en wrong, what happens t o th e co llective in telligence? If 
collective in telligence is t he capacity to  decide based on  collective memory, but is not fu lly reliab le, what 
type of individuals (agents) would make the social network more efficient? What effect would prejudice have 
when ap plied to strateg ies of in teraction in  a so cial net work? Prejudice i s som ething t hat i s gen erally 
considered t o be pe jorative. Now, t aking a s a basi c pre mise t he free ci rculation of information be tween 
individuals i n a soci al net work, w ould i t be p ossible t o affirm t hat a m odel i n w hich t hat network was 
essentially cooperative would always achieve better results than one that is essentially competitive, when the 
collective memory is loaded with prejudice? The work presented here attempts to act as a base from which to 
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find an answer to that question, analysing the relationship between the efficiency of a social network and the 
memories of t he individuals who make i t up, when the network i tself is not immune to information that is 
(potentially) incorrect. We start by defining two main types of i ndividual memory (short term memory and 
working memory). A Multi-Agent System (the Where’s Wally game) has been created where agents, having 
a limited sensorial range, try to find their partner by asking other agents who are in the vicinity whether they 
“saw agent X”. The goal of the simulation is to  see if it is p referable to have a cooperative or a co mpetitive 
model for a social network, when the s ocial interactions between the agents rely on a Prejudiced colle ctive 
memory. 
2. DEFINITIONS FOR MEMORY AND PREJUDICE 
We define Prejudice (or Preconception), P with two complimentary propositions: 
P1: (Prejudice is) believing sincerely in something without having checked the correctness of that belief; 
P2: (Prejudice is) Generalizing a belief (creation of stereotypes). 
In conceiving the m odel f or the g roup of e xperiments pre sented i n t his work, t he definition of s ocial 
network is th at o f a group  of in dividuals (ag ents) w ith t he ab ility to  in teract am ongst th emselves an d of 
storing information and facts th at are relevan t to the process of that interaction. Social networks are one of 
the bases of o rganizational networks. Acco rding to Mitchell (1969), “a social network is a s pecific s et of 
linkages among a set o f persons, with the additional property that the characteristics of th ese linkages as a 
whole may be used to interpret the social behaviour of the persons involved. We now move towards having a 
possible definition of the Efficiency of a Social Network, based on the literature from Economics (see for ex. 
Jackson, 2003). In our case , we define a measure of Efficiency of a Soc ial Network (ESN), as being "the 
quantity of individuals (agents) who managed to achieve their objectives within a determined period of time 
per total number of agents (population)”. We will formalize ESN as a measure of efficiency in the context of 
this work, later on . The objectives that the Agents have can, in turn, be (i ) Independent or (i i) Dependent. 
From these definitions we can see that according to (i) objectives can be as simple as (i) the mere survival of 
the age nt (behaviour t hat is esse ntially self-cent red) a nd which in  accorda nce with (ii), “teamwork” , 
(cooperative, altruistic beha viour) – as in soccer – is essential in order to achieve  good results. In addi tion, 
we ha ve defined m emory as t aking t he f ollowing f orms: A) I ndividual M emory; B ) col lective m emory. 
Individual memory (A) can be sub-divided into: A.i) Short-term Memory and A.ii) Working Memory. The 
reason for defining memory this way is that it allows us to separate the capacity for immediate perception of 
the h abitat with  th e cap acity to  make d eductions fro m k nown in formation. Th at is, we can  d efine th e 
following premises relating to memory depending on whether it deals with individual or collective memory. 
The first two premises (A.i and A.ii) relate to each of the components of individual memory: 
 Premise A.i, Short-term Memory gathers sensorial information. It permits a reactive response that 
makes use of the rules present in the working memory. 
 Premise (A.ii) Working Memory is the memory that permits the processing of the facts acquired for 
the posterior creation of new rules. 
 In a sim ilar manner, collective memory (B) was divided into two aspects identified as premises B.i and 
B.ii: 
 Premise (B.i) communication allows for individual access to the memory of other individuals; 
 Premise (B.ii) collective memory can be built by means of historical registers, i.e. logs. (This type of 
registration of the past was not applied to th is study. The study of the “weight of history” will be left to be 
dealt with in future works). 
3. METHODOLOGY AND MAIN QUESTIONS 
In the literature relating to Multi-Agent Systems (e.g. Ferber, 1999), an agent is usually seen as an entity that 
lives in an environment and who is capable of interacting with other agents. Many of these characteristics are 
related to  cogn itive cap abilities an d prej udice (No to et. Al, 2003). The con figuration of t he Mu lti-Agent 
System p resented in  th is work was carried  ou t using  the fo llowing an alogy: i magine th at all agents 
(individuals) go to a p arty, but they lose track of th eir partner. If th e agents have a li mited sensorial range, 
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what do they need to do in order to find their partner in the most effective way? One simple way of doing it is 
to make the agents ask other agents who are in the vicinity whether they “saw agent X”, and according to the 
answer given, move in that general direction. But which is most effective - t o remember a lot of events and 
transmit that information when asked, or not to do so? This approach allows us to build a simulation in which 
the ag ents “reme mber” th e i nteractions t hat th ey h ad wit h other ag ents. Bu t if t he ag ents don 't tran smit 
temporal information so that other ag ents can validate the inform ation, or taking into account that what is  
being t ransmitted can be outdated –  being exposed to the avai lable information can be counterproductive, 
preventing some agents from ever ach ieving their own objectives. Looking at this model globally, one could 
start to  in fer the answer to  the fo llowing questions: Is it preferable to  have agen ts with a lo t of individual 
memory, or with less memory (when it could contain incorrect data)? Is it preferable to have a cooperative or 
a co mpetitive m odel for a so cial network, when t he social in teractions between t he ag ents rely  on  a 
Prejudiced c ollective memory? Is t here s ome opt imal rel ationship bet ween t he pe rcentage of i ndividual 
memory used  for fixed r ules and t he percentage o f i ncorrect data of the inform ation fl ow in a  social 
network?In th is first wo rk, al l of the agents, who are called Wally[X], have objectives which (for X:=1 to  
Population) ar e i ndependent. Thi s m eans t hat al l age nts try to ac hieve goals th at only them selves are 
interested in. (Th e goal of an  agent is to  find another agent, who i s chosen randomly). I f agents were not 
aware of each fact, they would be in possession of a variable, but measurable, quantity of “erroneous facts”. 
It is enough, for t his, that a n agent (A) asks another agent (B) if they  have seen agent (C). The reply “he’s 
over there, in (X,Y)”, (X and Y being the geographical coordinates of the location of agent C), we now have 
the possibility to be led into error, as the target agent may, in the meantime, have moved, being therefore in a 
completely d ifferent po sition to  th at in itially referred  to as (X,Y). Fo r it to  b e possible to  m odel P2, th e 
choice was made to endow the agents with a group of characteristics that would be pretty much visible to the 
other age nts, depending o n t he di stance at whi ch t hey were. T he a nalogy use d was that of the direct 
observation of a pers on walking towards us: from a di stance we can see the colour of their clot hes; as they  
get closer, we can see th e colour of th eir hair, until finally, we can  see th e colour of their eyes, if th ey get 
close enough to  us. With this in  mind, a group of  characteristics was defin ed for one agent as if it were a 
generic group of five characteristics (A1 to A5), in which each one is define d in a 0-10 integer scale. The 
position of the agent is ad ded to th ese five generic characteristics, g iven by the coordinates (X,Y), an d its 
name (ID). It was agreed that when an agent interacts with another agent once (in which the distance between 
them is zero) the agents gets to know his ID as well as all the characteristics that the agent has at the moment 
of meeting. We can t herefore define the basic structure of a Wally[X] agent as bei ng: Agents = record {Id;  
ShortTermMemory; W orkingMemory; Po sition; G oal; Goal Achieved} i n w hich t he M axSTM and t he 
MaxWM co rrespond to  t he “Max imum Sho rt-term Memory” and “Maxim um Working Mem ory” 
respectively. The “habitat” of the ag ents is defined by:  Matrix  = a rray[1..WorldMaxX, 1..WorldMaxY] of  
integer; with WorldMaxX = 30 and WorldMaxY = 30. The sensorial capacity of the agents can also be given 
parameters, so that the flow of data received can be controlled. For this reason, an agent is only able to “see” 
as far as a horizon of five positions (cells of the matrix). Therefore if we count the positions around the agent, 
we have five possible values fo r each distance d((X0,Y0);(X1,Y1)). The group of experiments consists of  
varying th e parameters o f th e WorkingMemory and  ShortTermMemory, as well as th e po sition of a 
determined n umber of a gents. We have c onsidered P rejudice as t he t otal num ber of facts (Wally[X] is  
believed to  be at p osition(CoordX, CoordY)) presen t in co llective m emory th at are n evertheless wrong. 
Computation of the experiments' average values for some of the variables mentioned above was also done. 
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4. MAIN ALGORITHM 
The main algorithm is structured as follows: 
 
 
5. RESULTS 
By ru nning t he sim ulation f or different values o f WorkingMemorySize ( WMS) as  d efined b efore, a fi le 
containing t he resul ts pr oduced by  2 492 s imulations wa s anal ysed. T he Pearso n co rrelations bet ween t he 
variables defined above have computed. It i s important to mention that Pearson correlation between WMS 
(Working Memory Size) and MediumPrejudice is high (0.94). In order to measure the amount of prejudice 
involved in the simulation, a measure of the prejudice by memory (PBM) was computed, being given by the 
following equation: 
 
This measure captures the cost o f the search for Wally, taking in account th e number of known facts, as 
mentioned above. In addition, a measure of the efficiency of the social network (ESN) was also computed, as 
being the number of the inactive individuals: ESN=Population-ActivePopulation. Since active population is 
the number of individuals still seeking for their goal of “finding Wally”, then the remaining individuals (the 
inactive) are the ones that already ach ieved this goal. The Pearson correlation coefficient between these two 
measures (PBM and ESN) is approximately 0,75, revealing the direct association between the two measures. 
It is p ossible to  d etermine a statistical model to  th is relat ion: ESN= 427,88 PBM - 8,90 29, based on th e 
fitting of a regression line over the dispersion diagram of the two variables.  
6. CONCLUSIONS/FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 
The amount of information avai lable i s a fact or that must definitely be t aken into account in future work. 
However, when t he veracity of t he avai lable i nformation provided by  other agents cannot be ensured, t he 
model has sh own t hat di screte phe nomena occu rred rel ating t o t hose i ndividuals w ho o btained t he best  
results, given the fact that some agents had created clusters/ghettos, opened the way to agents who were less 
attached to the  prejudices. As Noto et. al, 2003, state, "( ...) Pre judice may be st udied as a m echanism for 
ALGORITHM Where_is_Wally 
 WHILE (( Time < EndOfParty) AND ActivePopulation > 0 )) DO 
  Time:=Time+1: 
  Cleanup_Collective_Memory_Older_Than(Remember); 
  ActivePopulation:=Check_For_Active_Population(); 
  Initialize_Party_State(Time); 
  FOR X:=1 TO Population DO 
   IF (Wally[X].GoalAchieved=FALSE) THEN 
    Check_Collective_Memory_Relative_To(X); 
    
Look_Around_For(Wally[X].Position.X,Wally[X].Position.Y,Wally[X
].Goal); 
    IF (Wally[X].GoalAchieved=FALSE) THEN 
     Ask_neighbours_about_my_goal(X); 
     IF ((ShortTermMemory_Contents(X)=0) AND 
(WorkingMemory(X)=0) THEN 
      move_randomly(X); 
     ELSE 
     IF (goal_is_in_WorkingMemory(X)>0) THEN 
       IF ((WorkingMemory_Contents(X)>0) AND 
(validate_goal(X,goal_is_in_WorkingMemory(X))) THEN 
        move_towards_goal(X,goal_is_in_WorkingMemory(X)); 
       END IF; 
      ELSE 
       move_towards_similar_entry_in_ShortTermMemory(X); 
      END IF; 
     END IF; 
    END IF; 
   END IF; 
  END FOR; 
 END WHILE; 
END. 
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generating knowledge starting from existing one. To a large extent, its utility is conditioned to the probability 
of error occurring during the process of generation, what equals to saying that prejudice may evolve in low-
error phases, but may become useless as e rror grows in knowledge generation (...)". Nevertheless, what this 
work seems to show even in this early stage is that prejudice can act as a  way of increase the efficiency of a 
social network. In other words, the response that the model seems to be showing us is that in a world loaded 
with information, in which the reliability of th e available information is n ot guaranteed, prejudice functions 
in fa vour of t hose i ndividuals wh o are strongly at tached to objectives  that are no t di rectly affected by it. 
Although t his conclusion see ms qui te surp rising, i t bo rrows ex planation fr om t he areas of o rganizational 
theories, namely organizational inertia, since prejudice can be seen as a form of inertia. Hannan and Freeman 
(1988) introduced the concept of st ructural inertia, stating that “structures of organizations have high inertia 
when the speed of reo rganization is much lower than the rate at wh ich environmental conditions change”. 
Therefore, a society t hat has  pre judices ca n be bad f or t he i ndividual, given t hat m any are not going t o 
achieve their individual objectives; but it does not have to be bad for that society, as some individuals may go 
on to achieve their objectives much faster. In future works, the creation of simplified models should be done, 
so we can be assured that no other variables are affecting the results. 
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